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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

21 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : William W. Wells  
Deputy Director for Operations  
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Actions of the  
Air Army During the Movement Forward and  
Commitment to Action of a Reserve Front  
in the Initial Period of War

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article examines specific measures and requirements for the successful fulfilment of actions of the air army in support of a reserve front, based on the experience of various exercises. These include maintaining constant combat readiness, conducting aerial reconnaissance, the efficient organization of combat actions of front aviation and fighter air cover, the role of air defense in covering troops, the procedure for rebasing all flight echelons, and the employment of air and motor transport for transferring personnel and materiel to areas of impending combat actions. The authors also emphasize the importance of ensuring continuous control of the air army during combat actions and rebasing. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (72) for 1964.  
[Redacted]

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned  
[Redacted]

WILLIAM W. WELLS



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
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# Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF

INFO. Mid-1964

21 September 1976

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Actions of the Air Army During the Movement Forward and Commitment to Action of a Reserve Front in the Initial Period of War

SOURCE

Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (72) for 1964 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The authors of this article are General-Leytenant of Aviation Ye. Gorbatyuk and Colonel P. Terekhov. This article examines specific measures and requirements for the successful fulfilment of actions of the air army in support of the full mobilization, movement forward and commitment to action of a reserve front, based on the experience of various exercises. These include maintaining constant combat readiness, conducting aerial reconnaissance, the efficient organization of combat actions of front aviation and fighter air cover, the role of air defense in covering troops, the procedure for rebasing all flight echelons, and the employment of air and motor transport for transferring personnel and materiel to areas of impending combat actions. The authors also emphasize the importance of ensuring continuous control of the air army during combat actions and rebasing, which requires the timely deployment and high mobility of control posts.

End of Summary

Comment:

Coroner General Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich Gorbatyuk has been identified as Chief of the Directorate of Military Educational Institutions of the Air Forces since 1971, and as a pilot during World War II. He also wrote "The Rebasing of Aviation Large Units and Units of Front Aviation from the Interior of the Country to a Theater of Military Operations" in Issue No. 3 (91) for 1970

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Actions of the Air Army During the Movement Forward and  
Commitment to Action of a Reserve Front in the Initial Period of War

by  
General-Leytenant of Aviation Ye. Gorbatyuk  
Colonel P. Terekhov

The sudden massed employment of nuclear weapons in the first days of a war will cause great losses in the armed forces of the sides. It will be required to quickly intensify efforts and develop the offensive of the operating fronts for the purpose of the quickest defeat of the opposing grouping of the enemy and the seizure of his territory in a short time.

To achieve the maximum surprise of actions, our probable enemy considers it advisable to begin an invasion with previously prepared forces simultaneously with a ballistic missile strike and actions of the tactical aviation and carrier-based aviation and strategic bombers. As the experience of exercises shows, up to 50 or 60 percent of the tactical fighters and reconnaissance aircraft will start operating at low altitudes, and the light and strategic bombers, at high and low altitudes, echeloned over the whole range of altitudes from extremely low to the edge of the stratosphere. The flight of all the aviation will be carried out on a broad front in squadrons, flights, pairs, and sometimes with single aircraft, carrying out maneuvers in altitude and direction, using all possible radio and radar jamming.

The conditions of the combat actions of the air army with the beginning of war, naturally, will be exceptionally complex. At this time, the front aviation, located in the interior of the country in the first days, will be required to quickly accomplish tasks in support of the full mobilization and movement forward of our troops and, along with this, to carry out rebasing in order to subsequently conduct combat actions with all its forces in support of the commitment of these troops to action. Hence, the very first obligation of the command and staff of the air army will be to ensure the high combat readiness of the air units and large units capable of fulfilling combat tasks under various conditions of the situation.

Maintaining the constant combat readiness of air units and large units for immediate actions is achieved by carrying out, already in peacetime, a

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number of important measures, directed, on the one hand, toward the high combat readiness of the flight personnel and keeping the materiel in full readiness for combat employment and, on the other hand, toward preserving the forces and means of the air army from enemy destruction in the period of his delivery of nuclear strikes.

The most important requirement of constant combat readiness is the combat alert status of air units (primarily, of fighter aviation), round-the-clock alert status of the combat crews of command posts and radiotechnical means, dispersed basing of the units and subunits on airfields, and also protection of the basing of the air large units against weapons of mass destruction.

An essential element in increasing the combat readiness of the aviation will be, as was indicated above, the establishment of a round-the-clock alert status of the combat crews of the command posts of all levels, which will guarantee the transmission of combat signals to executors in minimum times, quick alerting of units by a combat alert signal, and immediate control of the aircraft put into the air. It is not out of the question that, due to the situation before the beginning of or during the course of combat actions, quick rebasing of aviation control posts to new locations will be required. Better accomplishment of such relocations is facilitated by previously developed plans and calculations for relocating command posts, and by having all worked out a communications diagram, plans for mutual accommodation of departments and services, and the allocation of functions of staff departments in setting up a command post in a new location.

One of the main requirements of combat readiness of the aviation is timely (but not advance) dispersal of the basing of units and large units of aviation, which must proceed out of the concept of actions for covering advancing troops adopted already in peacetime. In working out the questions of rebasing air large units and units, it is necessary to take into consideration the time of starting the dispersal, the procedure of carrying it out, the distance of airfields from the national border, the main axes of movement of troops, the possible targets of enemy delivery of nuclear strikes, and the probable conditions of the radiation situation. In the process, one should in all cases proceed on the idea that dispersal must increase the level of combat readiness of aviation units and large units and be implemented on the basis of a regiment to one to two airfields. Otherwise, the air army, having crowded basing, is deprived of the capability of promptly putting aircraft in the air and meeting the enemy on the approaches to the troops and installations being covered.

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Under these conditions it will be incapable of conducting combat actions in support of the movement forward of troops.

To avoid enemy detection of the regrouping of forces of the air army, the dispersal of air units and large units to concealed airfields must be accomplished quickly, if possible just prior to the detected initiation of military actions by the aggressor. The flight movement is carried out in small groups at low altitudes under conditions of complete radio silence, and also with the carrying out of measures for operational camouflage.

Besides dispersal airfields to guarantee the maneuver of aviation during withdrawal from zones with high levels of radiation, it is advisable to have dirt alternate airfields. On them, an appropriate reserve of materiel-technical means is necessary.

Protecting the basing of the aviation from enemy means of mass destruction is important for maintaining the constant combat readiness of the units and large units of the air army. Besides readiness to protect personnel and materiel on airfields and warning of the threat of nuclear attack, timely airfield maneuvering which is already worked out in detail in peacetime is important.

Solving, if only in a first approximation, the problem of determining the effects of enemy nuclear strikes against airfields and selecting the variant of maneuver of air units is a very complicated matter. Therefore, we consider that the best results can be given by a system of automatic registration of the value of the parameters of the destructive properties of nuclear weapons in the area of a nuclear burst and representing them on screens set up at command posts at the regiment, division, and army levels. If there is not such a system, we consider it possible in practice to carry out the following measure.

For quick gathering of data about the results of nuclear strikes in the area of one or a group of airfields, observation and radiation reconnaissance helicopters should be deployed. The landing of these helicopters in selected areas is advisably carried out during the introduction of increased combat readiness. After the enemy nuclear strike, the helicopter crews must immediately inspect the airfields assigned to them and report to the command post of the air army on their condition and radiation situation. These same helicopter crews, having the minimum of communications means, radiation reconnaissance and landing means, also guarantee timely reception at airfields of aircraft put in the air by a combat alert signal from airfields of peacetime basing. Aircraft

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preparation at the new airfields is charged to mobile rear services groups, whose deployment location and time of moving forward must be the same as those of the observation and reconnaissance helicopters. The procedure of deployment of helicopters and rear services support groups drawn up on the basis of the experience of a 1963 exercise is shown in Figure 1.

The experience of exercises shows that, during the full mobilization, movement forward over a long distance, and commitment to action of the troops of a reserve front, the following periods of combat actions may be distinguished for the front aviation.

The first period: bringing the air army to combat readiness, carrying out the expansion and activation of air units in established areas with simultaneous fulfilment of the tasks of cover in support of the full mobilization and movement forward of the troops. In this period, the main task of the air army consists of fighter aviation cover of troops and rear installations against strikes of the tactical aviation and mainly the strategic bombers of the enemy. At the same time, the expansion and activation of new air units is carried out, and the preparation of the air army for rebasing in the area of impending combat actions is completed.

The second period: assisting the movement forward of the troops of the reserve front (cover against winged means of enemy air attack) and rebasing the air army into the zone of impending combat actions.

The third period: conducting combat actions in support of the commitment of the troops of the front to action and the development of the offensive operation. Acquiring exceptional importance at this time is the conduct of combat actions of the bomber forces, and sometimes also the fighter bombers, mainly for destroying enemy means of nuclear attack and carrying out aerial reconnaissance. Besides this, the air army may have part of its forces allocated for combating enemy airborne landing forces, conducting aerial reconnaissance of the routes of the movement forward of the troops of the front, and for carrying out measures for the further full mobilization of air units and large units. The indicated tasks form the basis of the organization of the combat actions of the air army of a reserve front.

\* \* \*

The main thing in the organization of the combat actions of an air army in support of a reserve front is quick rebasing of air large units and units to intermediate and departure airfields and timely development by

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them of combat actions to destroy the enemy. Delay will jeopardize the accomplishment by the air army of the tasks of fighter air cover, support and security of the commitment to action of the troops of the reserve front. Considering that the matters of the content and the adoption of a decision by the commander of the air army for combat actions are sufficiently well known, we will note only a few of its specific features.

Inasmuch as the movement forward and commitment to action of the troops of a reserve front is a single process, the decision of the commander of the air army must encompass the entire complex of matters of the combat actions of the air large units and units for the conditions indicated. Having a decisive influence on the rebasing procedures and the character of the combat actions of the air army, both during the regrouping of the troops of the front and during their commitment to action, will be the ground and air situation in the zones of the fronts operating forward. It goes without saying that the highly fluid nature of actions and the drastic changes in the operational situation will require of the commander of the air army deep operational foresight and maintenance of close cooperation of the air army of the advancing reserve front with the air armies of the operating fronts.


In case the front is committed to action to build up the efforts of the fronts committed to action earlier, or on a new operational axis, the rebasing and combat actions of the aviation are carried out more systematically. Rebasing of air large units and units to an area of impending combat actions may be carried out almost simultaneously (if there are the conditions for this), which will immediately change the air situation in favor of the troops of the front.

The experience of exercises conducted by us shows that simultaneous rebasing of all flight echelons of the units and large units of the air army may not always be the best variant. Sometimes rebasing is better carried out successively by types of aviation, with consideration, first of all, for fighter air cover of the troops of the military district (reserve front) being moved forward, and then for building up the efforts of the air army of the front operating forward, and finally, for participation in combat actions directly in support of the commitment to action of the troops. Based on this, the rebasing of the units and large units of the air army may look like the following (Figure 2).

In the first place, to strengthen fighter air cover toward the end of the first day and the beginning of the second, when the troops of the first echelon of the front have moved up 200 to 300 kilometers and begun to go



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beyond the limits of the operating zone of the fighters of the air army from rear airfields, it is advisable to rebase the fighter air division by regiments to intermediate airfields located 100 to 150 kilometers forward of the planned rest areas of the advancing troops. Subsequently, they should be rebased to the main airfield complex in the zone of impending combat actions. If there is a second fighter air division in the air army, it may, depending on the strength of the air defense forces of the country in the zone of movement of the front, either operate like the first division or, carrying out cover of the troops of the advancing front from departure basing airfields to the maximum operating radius of the fighters, also be rebased to the zone of impending combat actions about a day before the commitment of the troops to action.

The fighter-bomber aviation, in all cases, is to be rebased about one day before the arrival of troops in the areas of commitment to action. It is advisable to designate a departure airfield complex for it at such a distance from the front line as to ensure the safety of the fighter-bombers from the effect of the main mass of enemy operational-tactical missiles and to have for them the capability of carrying out from this air complex the first sortie for a combat task and then landing on forward airfields. Taking into consideration the aforementioned conditions and also the limited extent of the airfield network in the front area, we consider that it is advisable to have the departure airfield complex for SU-7B aircraft at a distance of 150 to 200 kilometers from the front line.

As regards bombers, they are advisably rebased in two stages. As a preliminary, one or two days before the commitment of troops of the front to action, they are to be rebased, at first, to an intermediate airfield complex reliably covered by the air defense means of the country and located at a distance of 550 to 600 kilometers from the front line, and then, in what constitutes the second stage, rebasing to the main airfield complex is to be carried out, but only after their fulfilment of the combat task in support of the commitment of the troops to action.

In respect to reconnaissance aviation, it should be considered advisable to rebase it in two echelons. The first echelon, comprising not less than one-third of the forces (counting non-T/O reconnaissance squadrons of fighter, fighter-bomber, and bomber aviation) is to be transferred to the area of combat actions one or two days before the commitment of the troops of the front to action. We consider that these forces, in cooperation with the aerial reconnaissance of the operating front, can detect the greater part of the missile/nuclear, aviation and ground groupings of the enemy in the area of impending actions of the



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troops. The remaining forces of the reconnaissance aviation should, for the purpose of preserving them from possible enemy strikes, be rebased into the area of combat actions just prior to the commitment of troops to the engagement.

In organizing the regrouping of front cruise missile (KR-170) air regiments, it is necessary to provide for their movement into concentration areas a day before their movement into the siting area, which is determined by the necessity of preparing the regiment for launching. The distance of the concentration area of the KR-170 regiment from the siting area must be not less than 150 to 160 kilometers, i.e., corresponding to a night march of the regiment. With an average movement speed of [figures missing] kilometers per hour, the columns of the front cruise missile regiment are able to go 1,000 to 1,250 kilometers in four to five days.

If the enemy manages, with sudden massed nuclear strikes on some axes, to inflict significant losses on the ground and aviation groupings near the border and go over to active offensive actions, the procedure of the rebasing and combat actions of the air army may have a different character. In this case, obviously, it will be required to immediately rebase part of the forces of the fighter-bombers and bombers (to deliver, jointly with the rocket troops and air army of the front operating forward, a powerful nuclear strike for the purpose of crushing the penetrating grouping of his troops, first of all, the nuclear/missile means and aviation), and also of the fighters in order to cover the deployment of the rocket troops and the large units of the first operational echelon of the front.

\* \* \*

The extensive development of the means of air attack of our probable enemies creates a real threat of the delivery of powerful strikes on the troops and installations of the rear of the reserve front with the beginning of war. Protection of troops of the reserve front in this connection takes on major importance. According to the experience of exercises, fighter air cover of the reserve front against the strikes of enemy winged means of attack may have the following organization.

Cover of the full mobilization of the troops of the reserve front with the beginning of military actions will be carried out mainly by the air defense forces of the country (simultaneously with their cover of technical and industrial centers) and also by the fighter aviation of the air army of the military district. Cover will also begin to be carried out by the





organic air defense means of the large units and formations of the ground forces. It is not out of the question that, as a result of enemy nuclear strikes, the air defense system existing in peacetime may be disrupted. In this connection, air defense plans must be adjusted, requiring broadening the zone of actions of the front fighters, moving their basing to the flanks, and establishing areas for fighter-bombers to cover also. Special attention must, in our opinion, be given to destruction of air-to-surface cruise missiles having a launch range up to 800 kilometers. For this, it is advisable to use the front fighter aviation for actions on the distant approaches to the areas of full mobilization in cooperation with the fighter aviation of the air defense of the country.

In one command-staff exercise, fighter air cover of the full mobilization of troops was carried out by the forces of one fighter air division and part of the forces of fighter-bombers. In this case, two regiments of fighters were put in the first echelon and committed to action on the distant approaches (on the line of commitment to action of the fighter aviation of the air defense of the country). Buildup of the efforts of the fighters of the first echelon was accomplished with a third air regiment equipped with MIG-19 aircraft and an air regiment of fighter-bombers with SU-7B aircraft. As a result, the grouping of fighter aviation established in time for the beginning of full mobilization (counting the three regiments of the air defense of the country) allowed the massing of efforts of four to five regiments of fighters on the most probable axis of enemy air actions.

Cover of the movement forward of the troops of the reserve front over a great distance will also be carried out by the fighter aviation of the air army in cooperation with the large units and formations of the air defense of the country. Taking an indirect part will be fighter aviation and surface-to-air missile troops deployed in the regrouping area of the front but subordinate to the fronts operating forward of and adjacent to it. Both in full mobilization and in regrouping, the main task in covering the troops of the front will, it seems to us, be fulfilled by the air defense forces of the country. The actions of the fighter aviation of the military district may be varied. In particular, when the air defense forces and means of the country and of our allied nations in the zone of advance of the troops are not strong enough or are neutralized by enemy nuclear strikes, it is advisable, during the first days, to cover the troops with all the available forces of fighter and fighter-bomber aviation, mainly from departure basing airfields, with subsequent successive rebasing of fighters to intermediate airfields.





If there is, in the zone of advance of the troops of the reserve front, a strong grouping of the air defense forces of the country, then the air army with its forces carries out cover of troops only from departure basing airfields. In accordance with the readiness of forward airfields, it is rebased to the area of impending combat actions and covers the movement forward and commitment to action of the troops of the front in cooperation with the fighter aviation of the air armies of the operating fronts.

Cover of troops during their commitment to action must be carried out by all the fighter forces of the air army in close cooperation with the surface-to-air missile troops of the front and with the fighter aviation of adjacent air armies and the air defense of the country. If there is in the air army one division of fighters, it can carry out cover in the entire zone of the front to the maximum operating radius of the fighters. In case there are in the air army two fighter air divisions, for each of them it is advisable to designate zones (areas) of combat actions. Intercept and destruction of aircraft and cruise means of the enemy in the air is carried out just as in the organization of troop cover in an ordinary operation.

Taking on importance in moving forward the troops of the reserve front is aerial reconnaissance, for which the requirements and volume of tasks are determined by the special conditions of movement forward and commitment to action of the troops. We consider that, in the period of regrouping of the latter, aerial reconnaissance must monitor the routes of their movement forward. The basic method of reconnaissance will be visual observation, and the means of reconnaissance, helicopters.

In the interests of obtaining the necessary data on the air and ground grouping of the enemy in order to make a decision on the commitment of troops to action from the march, it is necessary to include part of the forces of the reconnaissance aviation, as indicated above, in combat activity one to two days before the approach of the troops of the front, with subsequent allocation of the remaining forces as the units and large units of the air army are rebased.

A specific feature of the conduct of aerial reconnaissance will be the fact that, in the period of commitment to action, a complete observation of the whole zone to a depth up to 150 to 250 kilometers is necessary not less than seven times a day. This will require a great expenditure of forces and means, in connection with which it will be necessary to allocate, for purposes of reconnaissance, non-T/O reconnaissance squadrons and, in some cases, also subunits of combat aviation.






Exceptionally important in significance and complex in organization will be the combat actions of the air army in support of the commitment to action of the troops of the reserve front. The complexity of this process consists above all in this, that the relatively simultaneous commitment to action of one or two formations of the ground forces will take place under conditions of exceptionally aggressive actions of the aviation and wide employment of missiles by the enemy. That means that, if the rocket troops and aviation do not manage to destroy the nuclear means and neutralize the aviation of the enemy, the reserve front will hardly be able to fulfil the tasks assigned to it. Therefore, even before the commitment or during the period of commitment to action, as its main task, the air army, jointly with the rocket troops, is faced with destroying the enemy means of air attack on the ground and in the air.

The combat actions of the air army in support of the commitment to action, in our opinion, will not be a one-time process manifested in the delivery of one massed strike on the missile/nuclear means of the enemy. On the contrary, the air army of the front, already long before the commitment to action of the troops, will be able to take part in the destruction of the missile/nuclear means in the zone of the air army operating forward, in this manner successively being involved in combat actions for destroying the enemy. The situation indicated may be characteristic of those cases in which both opposing groupings, after exchanging powerful nuclear strikes in the first period of military actions, have suffered considerable losses. In this case, in order to establish subsequent nuclear superiority over the enemy, the front aviation of the reserve front will also be allocated, since, in comparison with the rocket troops, it has the greatest mobility in actions. Under such conditions, the quantity of nuclear warheads allocated to the air army must be increased and may, according to the experience of exercises, constitute up to 90 to 95 warheads.

In the period of the direct commitment to action of the troops of the front, the air army concentrates its efforts on, besides the cover of troops, the destruction of newly detected means of nuclear attack and aviation of the enemy, and also the destruction of his groupings of troops hindering successful development of the offensive. In the interests of creating favorable conditions for the commitment to action of the front, actions of part of the forces of air armies of fronts that have previously developed actions are advisable. In such a situation, preliminary coordination of the time and targets of the strike will be required in order to immediately exploit their results with troops when they are committed to action.



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
In present-day conditions, all-round preparation of the rebasing of units and large units of the air army to an area of impending combat actions is extremely important.

The overall requirements of the aviation of a military district for airfields will be determined, first of all, by the combat strength of the air army, but also by the conditions that provide for its survivability during regrouping. Based on the possible average strength of the air army (one to two fighter air divisions, one to two fighter-bomber regiments, one regiment each of bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, and cruise missiles, a transport regiment, a helicopter regiment, and a medical evacuation regiment, a communications regiment, and one to two separate squadrons), up to 12 to 16 airfields in all will be required, which it is fully possible to allocate for the regrouping of an air army under the conditions of the Western Theater of Military Operations.

The situation of a beginning war and the urgent need for dependable cover of troops during regrouping, the high rates of movement, and also provision for the greatest possible mobility of the units of the air army for conducting combat actions in support of the commitment to action of the troops of a front, will require rebasing of the personnel of the units and large units, mainly of fighter aviation, to be carried out by air transport. All the minimum necessary technical means, means of communications and radiotechnical equipment, except radars and compressors and air-to-air missile preparation positions, must also be transported by aircraft and helicopters. The missile preparation positions are rebased by the leapfrog method, on the consideration that there must be in deployed status every day not less than one position, which will also guarantee the preparation of missiles for the fighter air regiments conducting combat actions for cover of the movement forward of troops of the front. Radar means are rebased by the same leapfrog method using motor transport.

Calculations show that to support the transfer of the operations group and the command post (of the air army, front cruise missiles) and also of the advance groups (the minimum necessary number of personnel and materiel-technical means of the units and large units of the air army) will require up to 70 sorties of MI-4 and MI-6 helicopters and up to ten sorties of AN-12 aircraft. For purposes of airlifting personnel and technical means to support short-term combat actions of one division of fighters from intermediate airfields, it is necessary to carry out up to another 140 sorties of MI-4 and MI-6 helicopters and up to 15 to 20 sorties of AN-12

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aircraft. Besides this, to deliver operations groups and reduced-strength command posts of the army and front to the zone of their actions, and also those of the rocket troops, will require carrying out up to about 45 to 50 sorties of MI-4 and MI-6 helicopters and up to 15 to 20 sorties of AN-12 aircraft. Thus, rebasing by air, figuring for one position, requires carrying out up to 250 helicopter sorties and up to 40 to 50 aircraft sorties. For this, it is necessary to have in the air armies and the air forces of the military districts up to two helicopter regiments and up to one squadron of aircraft of the types indicated.

Transfer of the remaining personnel of the air units and rear services units is carried out by motor transport over routes coordinated with the staff of the front. In the exercises conducted by us, departure of the komendaturas of the separate airfield technical servicing battalion of the air regiment, the separate airfield engineer battalion, and the communications and radiotechnical equipment units was implemented, as to time, immediately upon the making of the decision by the air army commander to rebase and, as to place, in the first echelon behind the rocket troops of the front. It is better to assign them those routes which are not taken by the troops, which will ensure high rates of movement forward of the air units into the assigned areas. With an average daily march of up to 250 to 300 kilometers, the indicated units are capable of covering a distance of 1,000 to 1,250 kilometers in an average of four days and, on the fifth day, of assuming readiness for full-fledged servicing of air regiments at the new airfields.

So, with all the mobility of the front cruise missile air units and the rear services air units, rebasing of the air army to a zone of impending combat actions represents a complex task requiring precise organization of support and planning.

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A specific feature of control of the air army under the conditions considered is the fact that it must be carried out from highly mobile control posts of the air army and its large units while they are collocated with the combined-arms control posts.

For purposes of ensuring continuity of control of the combat actions and rebasing of the air army during the regrouping of forces, it is advisable to deploy at once a forward command post, command post, and rear control post at the air army level. It seems to us that, with the adoption of the decision to rebase air units and large units, it is necessary to








deploy a forward command post in the area of impending combat actions, and the commander of the air army must be transferred there at once. Located at the forward command post immediately in the area of combat actions, he will be able to familiarize himself with the situation, refine the decision for the combat actions of the aviation, and take control at once of the redeployed forward units and large units. During this same time, the large units and separate units of the air army deploy their own control posts, which immediately prepare to take over the control of the combat actions of the units. In the case where forward command posts of the combined-arms armies are deployed in advance in the area of impending combat actions, operations groups with the appropriate means of communications must be sent from the air army to these control posts.

The command post and the rear control post of the air army must follow as part of the ground or flight echelons and be deployed successively with the corresponding control posts of the front.

An important matter in continuous control of aviation under the conditions of a highly fluid situation is the timely relocation of command posts, in particular the command post of the air army. In this connection, in order to increase the mobility and reliability of control, the need has arisen to develop a mobile air army command post with permanent accommodation of all its elements in specially equipped MI-6 helicopters. The presently available air army command posts, installed in motor vehicles, have, during the operational exercises carried out by us, provided excellent conveniences for work under field conditions and quick, 25-minute to 35-minute setting up and closing down. However, the indicated command posts are bulky and have a poor cross-country capability. Considering that, under conditions of the employment of weapons of mass destruction, all kinds of movement will entail negotiation of zones of contamination and destruction, the use of command posts installed in motor vehicles will hardly be able to provide the required mobility for control of aviation. The mobile command posts in MI-4 helicopters that are now in service are very low-powered, and, in practice, the means of communications available in them are able to provide stable control of aviation only at the air division level. We consider it advisable to install the command post of the air army in two MI-6 helicopters. These machines permit the installation of the necessary means of communications, various plotting tables, and also means for automating the processes of control. In a command-staff exercise conducted in 1963 for the purpose of increasing mobility, reduced-strength command posts of the air army and the front, with a minimum of necessary means of communications were repeatedly rebased to new locations using MI-4 and MI-6 helicopters, which significantly




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



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increased their mobility and, consequently, provided continuous control of the actions of troops and aviation both while moving forward and during the operation of the troops of the front.



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


АП ВА = Air Army Command Post

Legend

-  Observation, radiation reconnaissance, and landing support helicopter
-  Mobile rear services groups
-  Possible zone of destruction of airfield area by a nuclear warhead
-  Route of flight by helicopters around basing area after nuclear strike
-  Aircraft groups landing at usable airfields

Figure 1. Procedure of deployment and fulfilment of tasks by helicopters and mobile rear services groups, with an enemy nuclear strike against airfields of the air army (variant).









Figure 2. Fighter air cover of troops in departure position and during movement of troops of a front with rebasing of the air army to the area of impending combat actions at the same time (variant).

- Рубеж взаимодействия с ПВО Line of cooperation with air defense
- Рубеж ввода ИА ПВО Line of commitment of air defense fighter aviation
- Рубеж ввода ИАД ВА Line of commitment of air army fighter air division
- Первый вылет ВАП First sortie of bomber air regiment
- Район отдыха войск № 3 (2, 1) Troop rest area No. 3 (2, 1)
- ЗРВ Surface-to-air missile troops
- ИАД Fighter air division
- скопление войск Concentration of troops
- ИА ВА впереди действа. фронта Fighter aviation of air army of front operating forward





Первый пуск ФКР	First launch of <u>front</u> cruise missiles
АНП	<u>Front</u> cruise missile air regiment
ЦУ	Central air control radar station
Р-н сосред. АНП	Concentration area of <u>front</u> cruise missile air regiment
Первый вылет АПИБ	First sortie of fighter-bomber air regiment
АПИБ после 1-го вылета	Fighter-bomber air regiment after first sortie
БАП после 1-го вылета	Bomber air regiment after first sortie
ОРАП	Separate air reconnaissance regiment
ИА ПВО	Fighter aviation of the air defense
ЗРВ	Surface-to-air missile troops
Район рассредоточения войск	Dispersal area of troops
Зоны дежурства в воздухе при перехвате низколетящие цели	Zones of airborne alert for intercept of low-flying targets
АПИБ	Fighter-bomber air regiment
Исходный район базирования ВА для ведения боевых действий	Departure basing area of air army for conduct of combat actions
Промежуточные аэродромы базирования	Intermediate basing airfields
Базирование на аэродромах рассредоточения	Basing on dispersal airfields
БАП	Bomber air regiment

